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Abstract
The paper focuses on the question whether banks and capital markets in Central
Europe are capable of exerting a positive influence on enterprise performance at the
present stage of the economic transformation. These markets are characterised by
privileged, collaborative interfirm/interbank relationships demonstrated through various
channels. Among them is the competition for private deposits between commercial and
national banks that are simultaneously supervisors of commercial banks, as is the case in
Poland. Other channels include: heavily indebted large banks that are owners of industrial
companies (as is the case in Slovakia with the steel mill VSZ owning the third largest bank
IRB), investment funds that are facilitating industrial restructuring, and foreign banks
holding only minority stakes in large domestic financial institutions.1. Introduction 
In a market economy, the financial sector is one of the key channels for economic
performance. It is as a vehicle for mobilising private savings and allocating them to investment
[Corbett, 1990; Porter 1992]. Therefore, one of the cornerstones in a successful
transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy is the development of financial
institutions with effective corporate governance [Commission, 1997]. 
The organisational setting and capacity of financial institutions before the collapse of
communism was considerably different from market economies [Zwass, 1979]. Bank
services to and households were essentially limited to taking deposits. Transactions of private
individuals, namely wages and purchases of consumer goods, were settled predominantly in
cash. Commercial banking transactions were essentially facilitated by a monobank or by a
few state-owned banks, and money served only the functions of a medium of exchange and
a unit of account, not a store of value. Government-dependent national banks controlled all
banking activities. Most of the countries had a specialized foreign trade bank established to
handle foreign currency transactions and foreign credits. Public savings banks and savings
associations did exist, but had limited product range.  Stock exchanges were certainly not
established. The socialist banks could neither turn away their clients nor declare them
bankrupt. Banks served as a venue of "planning control" and "management control" [Zwass,
1979]. In general terms, their functions very distinctively different from those performed by
banks in a corporate governance framework.
In the early stage of the economic transformation, commercial banks emerged primarily as
spin-offs from the national banks. They have gradually become independent of government
influences. The reforming authorities allowed entry of private and foreign banks, and they
established formal stock exchanges. While the institutional setting of the financial sector was
changed rather quickly, the necessary legal framework lagged behind.  Specifically, a system of
effective bank monitoring and supervision along with deposit insurance were set up at a slower
pace. Privatisation of large state owned banks was hampered by political bickering. It has not
been fully implemented in the first decade after the collapse of communism. During those ten
years, the financial sector development has been plagued by bankruptcies and obstructed by
financial crises. Fraud and imprudent banking have been widespread in the ten Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEEC-10) [1] and peculiar bank/interfirm relationships have
emerged [2]. This paper examines the extent to which banks and capital markets in Central
Europe are capable of exerting a positive influence on enterprise performance.
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[1] CEEC-10: Bulgaria, Czech Republik, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, i.e. the ten EU-associated Central and East European Countries which eventually will become
members of the European Union.
[2] For the history of post communist banking 19881995, see Fink/Haiss [1997a and b].2. Corporate Governance
The role of corporate governance is to ensure that market signals and other relevant
information are translated into investment decisions [Berglöf, 1997]. Corporate
governance deals with imperfect information and different mechanisms that reduce or
eliminate moral hazard in the relation between firms and financiers [Hellwig, 1991]. It
implies that groups of owners and other stakeholders have mutual, interconnected and
hierarchical, but not necessarily uni-directional relationships of influence, ruling, and
leading. 
Balling (1998) developed a "matrix of governance by sector" as a way of depicting
directions of influence capacity, i.e. the power as the ability to get things done the
way the respective individuals, organisations or institutions want them to be done
[Gibson, Ivancevich and Donnelly, 1985]. Within that two-dimensional framework, it
is possible to discuss directions, levels, causes and consequences of various
stakeholders positions and their influence in the corporate governance process. The
same groups of stakeholders are presented at the top of columns and at the left
corner of rows, implying that the stakeholders are able to exercise governance on
others at various degrees, while being under the influence of the market participants
in other respects. The use of corporate governance instruments by banks depends
on the prevailing system of governance and supervision. "If we move into the Matrix
from the top and follow a column, we look at the business world from the point of
people and institutions who ... have influence... If we go into the Matrix of
Governance from the left and follow a row, we look at the world from the point of
view of market participants that are under influence of market participants in other
respects" [Balling, 1998] (see Table 1).
Balling (1998) assumes that the setting for corporate governance in Central
Europe mirrors the situation in market economies and that "if the corporate clients
are in financial difficulties, the officials of the bank will normally be in a much better
position to evaluate the prospects for recovery than other market participants are"
[Balling, 1998] .... and will act accordingly. Therefore, certain cells are treated as  "not
relevant". They are shown by gray shaded areas indicating no influence of
stakeholders on three groups: on "government", "central bank and supervisory
authority" and on "personal investors, household and others". Further extensions to
this model emphasize changes required for an appropriate theory of corporate
governance in transition economies.
The political economy approach applied in this paper assumes that individuals
(bankers, depositors, investors, politicians, company managers), organisations
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(governments and their supervisory or privatisation agencies etc.) work, save and
consume in order to maximise their own utility [Baldwin, Francois and Portes, 1997].
Stakeholders wish to influence corporate decision-making in accordance with their
own interests, particularly when there is a transfer of control. Such transfer takes
place through privatisation, takeovers, mergers, restructuring, financial distress or
full bankruptcy [Balling, 1998]. It may be also facilitated through layoffs and dismissals
of managers or staff members. In essence, corporate governance is driven by the
objectives and by the power of stakeholders.
Our analysis takes into consideration possible gains of stakeholders from prudent
and non-prudent banking.  It further differentiates between the "government" as the
principal owner of corporations and banks, the privatisation agency which controls
part of state property, and the political parties and lobby groups close to political
circles.
The analysis begins from a differentiation between sound and weak investors
within the general category of "investors".  It does not initially introduce a distinction
between institutional investors, non-financial companies and foreign companies.
2.1. Privileged Bank/Interfirm Relationships as a Trigger?
A new set of privileged interfirm/bank relationships has developed in the CEECs
since the fall of the iron curtain.  These relationships are significantly different from
those under the communist heritage, but they are also very different from those
prevailing in developed market economies. Forms of ownership and stakeholder
influences vary considerably from country to country. There are diversified cases of
companies owned or run by governmental entities, by banks and related financial
institutions, by institutional investors or their surrogates, by non-financial companies,
and by foreign investors in all examined transition economies [Balling, 1998]. By
contrast, privileged bank/interfirm relationships are rare in the United States and the
United Kingdom.  In these highly developed industrial economies and financial
markets banks are discouraged from the ownership of non-financial businesses.  They
can influence companies only in their capacity as lenders. Non-bank institutional
investors, mainly pension funds, insurance companies, are all active players in stock
markets. For example, pension funds control more than 40 percent of the United
States large and midsize businesses, and they hold about 40% of the medium-term
and long-term debt of larger US based companies [Drucker, 1991].  In their dual- role
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with the companies in which they invest or lend. They act essentially as pure asset
managers. 
The continental Europe is dominated by the universal banking system that is
distinctively different from the British and American model. In the European system,
banks are permitted to have a wide range of activities within the financial services
industry, for instance branching into securities and insurance. They are also allowed
to hold majority stakes in businesses linked to banking, including real estate, and in
businesses unrelated to banking, such as industrial and trade companies.  Banks that
are owned or strongly supported by the state or large municipalities have also
traditionally played a significant role in these countries. The boards of directors of
these banks often represent more diverse groups of stakeholders or constituents
than shareholders. In the continental European system of "dedicated" capital [Porter,
1992], the dominant owners are principals rather than agents; they hold sizeable
stakes, thereby providing stability. These owners are typically permanent and they
seek long-term appreciation of their shares, thus having both the incentives and the
ability to engage in extensive and ongoing information gathering about their
companies. Unlike the "liquid" capital system, in which the goals are driven solely by
the financial transaction, the goals in the "dedicated" system are driven by
relationships in order to maximise the wealth-producing capacity of the enterprise
[Drucker, 1991]. Suppliers and clients own stakes in each other companies.  They do
not necessarily seek short-term capital gains from the share ownership.  They are
more interested in a long-lasting business relationship. Bank ownership helps firms to
formulate corporate strategies and it assists them with raising funds to carry out
these strategies [Thurow, 1992]. 
In such privileged interfirm/bank relationship systems, banks often dominate the
corporate boards for two reasons: They are either principal holders of equity stakes
or they are granted voting rights by the shareholders of these companies when they
purchase the shares from the bank (that is, proxy rights). Such practice provides
banks with both non-public information and with a considerable influence over
management decisions involving corporate restructuring activities. The close co-
operation between banks and firms lowers the cost of credit due to lower
transaction and information costs by increasing the lenders stake in keeping the
company afloat [OECD, 1995]. Firms that do not meet their banks performance
benchmarks find themselves under pressure to restructure [Walter, 1994].  
The positive continental European experience with the privileged interfirm/bank
relationship system suggests that such arrangement can encourage continued and
aggressive investment aimed at upgrading capabilities and at increasing productivity
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stakeholders and to allocate capital efficiently within the economy, particularly in
those intangible assets and capabilities required for competitiveness  research and
development, employee training and skills development, information systems,
organisational development and supplier relations [Porter, 1992]. Stable
relationships between shareholders, bankers and firms allow managers and owners
to make valuable long-term commitments to each other. In essence, privileged
firm/bank relationships by improving corporate governance relations can serve as a
trigger of profitability and economic growth, however, only if banks and other
stakeholders behave prudently. These advantages seem to outweigh possible
weaknesses of privileged firm/bank relationships that may include: slow funding of
emerging industries, a high-risk of start-up companies, slow redeployment of
capital, and possible conflict of interest. As long as there is enough competition and
growth in the market place, market discipline is a powerful instrument for providing
incentives for the financial institutions themselves to act prudently [Allen, 1993;
Koguchi, 1993]. 
2.2. Gains from Non-Prudent Banking 
The state as an owner is rather weak in pressing companies to be profitable [Fink
and Schediwy, 1992] since other interest, e.g. "protecting work places" and avoiding
political trouble, override the interest in reasonable profits of banks and state owned
companies. Selected features of non-prudence may even be welcome to political
rulers since non-prudence gives leeway in exercising power. It helps to get access to
capital for political purposes and to serve the politicians cronies. There may be also
a lack of political will to exercise strong bank supervision [Baer and Gray, 1996, 78]
because political parties and their allies may gain from non-prudent banking.
In every financial system banks have to be geared towards prudent banking.
Positive effects of prudent banking are a public good and they accrue to the general
public. Most importantly, the economic stability generated by prudent banking leads
to an increasing propensity to save. The accelerated saving is normally channeled by
banks into efficient investment, thus it ultimately contributes to growth and to
prosperity of nations. The production of public goods justifies public (i.e.
governmental) action.
In transition economies most of short-term gains from prudent banking are
accrued by politically weak stakeholder groups (depositors) or by insider groups.
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capable of generating significantly larger direct gains from non-prudent banking. In this
stakeholder framework, short-term gains from non-prudent banking are primarily
accrued by insiders (dominant owners, managers, high rank employees).  If bank
supervision is inefficient, there is a strong tendency that insiders shift to non-prudent
banking to internalise quick and large gains from high-risk opportunities, whereas
losses from these undertakings are borne by outsiders. In the absence of efficient
bank supervision, "new banking licences may initially be nothing more than a licence
to steal" [Akerloff and Romer, 1994, quoted by Baer and Gray, 1996].
2.3. Interest and Power
There is a mutual influence among stakeholders in transition economies.  This
occurs primarily among those in the "shaded" cells referred to as "not relevant"
according to Balling (1998). The unwillingness of banks and their Investment
Privatisation Funds (IPFs) or self-reliant National Investment Funds (NIFs) can, for
example, heavily influence further privatisations via divestments, twilight reporting
etc. There is, however a difference in the magnitude and phasing for depositors and
the general publics influence in this scenario compared to the stakeholders
framework. In this case, there is an apparent transmission of savings out of vouchers
and IPFs and voting in federal elections clearly function with a time lag. 
Individual bankers in CEEC-10 take into consideration the interests of major
stakeholders to a higher degree than in the majority of financial systems in industrial
economies. These major stakeholders include a minister of finance, the national bank,
privatisation agencies, own bank staff, depositors, large state-owned corporations,
sometimes also shareholders and new private investors. The timing and intensity of
bank reforms are determined by the vested interests of the following parties:
 The ministry of finance, often a major debtor representing the state as the
owner of large banks.
 Privatisation agencies that influence the timing and select the buyers of privatised
banks and their major corporate clients. They ultimately determine the links between the
banks and the corporations, as well as the potential level of corporate debt.
 The national bank, often serving as the major supplier of funds. The ministry of
finance and the national bank that are responsible for banking  supervision, nomination of
bank managers, and decisions on bank recapitalisation.
 Bank employees that are interested in keeping their positions and in delaying efforts
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their superiors for the purpose of risk aversion.
 Large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are primary corporate debtors and that
often exercise influence on bank managers. Their pressures distort effective credit
allocation.
 Depositors who serve as providers of retail refinance and who have little influence
over bank management. They can exert influence only indirectly as voters in
parliamentary elections. 
 New private investors having initially a limited influence, but willing to gain access
to bank credit. They seek to gain influence on the bankers decision making. They are
often crowded out the debt market by the state and by large (still or formerly state-
owned) enterprises. 
Bank management flexibility and the presumed strength of relevant stakeholders also
show up in various positions of the balance sheet. This analysis reveals the dilemma in
bank politics. As long as banks are state owned and repeatedly capitalised or refinanced
by the Central Bank, the interest of the ministry of finance and the Central Bank in "as
little trouble as possible" prevails. Corporate governance by banks can only assume a
modest withdrawal from major debtors.  Otherwise, the bank may cease to exist and
unemployment may soar as a result of the collapse of large corporations.
Power among corporate governance actors can be derived from a variety of sources:
the stakeholders ability to influence because of position (legitimate power) or special
expertise (expert power) and the ability to reward followers for compliance (reward
power). This is confronted by the power to punish for non-compliance (coercive power)
[Gibson, Ivancevich and Donnelly, 1985]. An access to resources (money, information,
jobs...) is not the only factor playing a role in exercising power.  Stakeholders can further
enhance their position through the strength of their involvement in the capital budgeting
process  they may have an impact on the scope and the timing of investment decisions,
as well as on considerations of decision alternatives and opportunity costs stemming from
alternative decisions.
Governmental actors and political circles may rely on a variety of power sources
aimed at influencing other stakeholders. For example, federal and municipal governments
can influence each others positions by providing guarantees to the banks that are close
to them. Moreover, governmental actors can also influence the central bank and
supervisory authorities by changing laws on banks own funds and on recapitalization.
They may further engage in "budget games", i.e. restrictions with regard to staff,
information technology etc. 
Companies and banks that have been nationalised or that depend on transactions
with the government are particularly susceptible to political influences in post-
12
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communist countries. Companies seek the public sector support by engaging in
government procurement and banks by holding public accounts. The timing and
procedures of privatization and social security reform provide ample opportunities to
influence companies that hold portfolios of other companies, e.g. National
Investment Funds and insurance companies desperately searching for reasonable
investments. 
The above-discussed problems also pertain to the enterprises that are still state-
owned. Some of their deficiencies in the area of corporate governance are addressed by
the expertise on connections and decision-making of banks, Investment Privatization
Funds, and political circles.  For instance, concerns about debt relief are shared by owner-
managers who have acquired considerable stakes through privatization and by workers
councils. Depositors and the general public can be influenced, for example, via
inflationary threats. In order to control the influence of foreign multinational investors and
companies, the government has two choices. It can either restrict their share to a level
below 25% or exert pressures on suppliers and bankers to tighten its certain grip  which
opens ways towards collaborative actions. 
The managers of banks have more room to maneuver when the role of the state in
the banking system becomes more limited. However, powerful asset side stakeholders
gain a dominant position over banks by increasing their stake in the bank. Since private
depositors have little impact on bank management, the pressure to exercise corporate
governance on major debtors remains weak if these debtors become owners of a bank.
To cushion these influences, managers may form coalitions with preferred borrowers.
These coalitions have opened the opportunity of asset stripping in case of financial
distress in the CEECs.
Privatization Investment Funds (PIFs) have grown mainly out of the voucher
privatization. They have been viewed as a venue of diversification of mutual fund
providers varied by their managerial expertise [Balling, 1998; Boeri and Perasso, 1998].
However, since the largest IPFs are controlled by banks, they essentially serve as
subordinates of banks. In the United States and the United Kingdom, shareholdings of
institutional investors comprise in particular ownership of listed companies, mainly
because of legal requirements concerning their portfolio structure [Balling, 1998]. In the
near absence of true, independent institutional investors in the CEEC-10, however, we
need to refer to typical "National Property Funds" (NPFs) as in Czech Republic or to
"National Investment Funds" (NIFs) of the Polish kind.
In Czech Republic, state shareholdings in "privatized" enterprises are practically
vested in the National Property Fund (NPF), while in Poland, shares of firms included in
the privatization programs are allocated to the National Investment Funds [NIFs; Boeri
and Perasso, 1998]. Together with (mostly still state-owned) insurance companies, thesefunds hold portfolios of various assets, some with little and some with high value. They
also share some functions normally attributed to institutional investors in market-driven
economies. Consolidated banks that were handed over the worst of the bad loan
portfolios in most CE-countries and that are frequently referred to as "bad loan banks"
also share some of these features. They are usually a part of the formal government and
directly government-dependent and, to various degrees, locked in the respective national
bank for refinance.
Stakeholders in transition economies can hardly be separated from one another in
contrast to highly developed market economies. They are more interdependent and
evolving. They are bound by renegotiated incomplete contracts between stakeholders
since "... ownership and state boundaries remain poorly defined, the state became an
active partner with banks and distinct groups of producers to forge new institutions for
negotiated solutions" [Hayri and McDermott, 1998; 153]. They share certain aspects of
"virtual" organisations, which can be illustrated by the following case studies.
2.4. Case Studies on Privileged Firm-Bank Relationships
Czech Republic: The Ceská Pojistóvna Network
In former Czechoslovakia, two insurance companies existed side by side, but their
markets were clearly separated by geography. By the end of 1996, there were 35
insurance institutions registered in Czech Republic, out of which 14 were joint stock
companies with exclusively Czech capital, eight had foreign capital, and six had mixed
capital participation [Cejková, 1998]. However, Ceská Pojistóvna, the top player in the
insurance market with a share of roughly 60 percent of the Czech insurance market and
was not nationalized until recently.
Ceská Pojistóvna lost about $9 million through its fraud-ridden Pragobanka/Kreditni
banka subsidiary in 1996, resulting in a loss of roughly $7 million in 1996 despite its near-
monopoly stake on the domestic insurance market [Harris, 1998]. Ceská Pojistóvna
injected 2.5 billion crowns to Pragobanka in 1996 when it was under forced
administration to halt its bankruptcy. In 1997, Pragobanka posted a loss of roughly 900
million crowns in 1997, primarily due to the fact that it is constantly having to create
reserves. 
In early 1998 PPF , an investment fund owning 21 percent of Ceská Pojistóvna took
management control by teaming up with at the time state-owned banks  Investicní a
Postovní Banka (IPB owns 12%), Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka (CSOB, 14%) and
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buying the shares held by IPB and CSOB and exercised the option to buy the 14 percent
CSOB-stake together with IPB, thus also gained formal majority. In 1997, IPB took
control of Ceska Pojistóvna´s investment activities, including a 10 percent stake of the
state savings bank, Ceská Sporitelná. To combat the outcome of such vested interests
(e.g. violations of shareholder rights and allegations of illegal or unethical activity), the
Czech National Bank, the Securities Commission and the Finance Ministry signed an
agreement on tighter cooperation in banking, capital markets, insurance and pension
supervision only in summer 1998. 
Czech Republic/Slovakia: The Reappearance of the Tercier Group
At the beginning of 1997, the Tercier financial group disappeared and with it several
billion crowns from small depositors. More or less the same former Tercier management
forged a new coup in the insurance industry, involving Pojistovna Moravna (PM). The
liquidation of that insurance company, which held a market share of about 0.7 percent
was the first grave problem in the Czech insurance sector [CTK, 1998a]. 
In October 1997, the finance ministry imposed forced administration on Bankovni
Penzijni Fond (PBF) pension fund, whereby some of PMs assets came under state
control since PM is the majority owner of PBF . PM is held by Zdravi Plus, minority
shareholders are Banka Hana and the Slovak insurer Slovenska Poistovna. While PMs
collapse was officially referred to 1996 flood damage claims, it was mainly caused by
dumping prices through which PM wanted to gain market share, general
mismanagement and poor know-how taken over from Slovenska postoivna [CTK,
1998b]. On May 6 1998, the Czech finance ministry revoked Pojistovna Morava´s
operating license, because its loss in 1997 exceeded its share capital. On May 15 the
insurer Pojistovna Universal (formerly Poijstovna Tercier) concluded a contract with
PM, under which it took over all PM clients and all rights and duties arising from signed
contracts. The contract was concluded without the consent of the Association of
Pojistovna Morava Clients (SKPM). The Czech finance ministry considers the contract
"legally vague", since it was not the company, but the contracts that were taken over.
At the request of Moravas Clients (SKPM), the finance ministry carried out an audit
into Pojistovna Universal to check its financial position. The audit resulted in forced
administration imposed on Universal. Pojistovna Universal was set up in 1993 by,
among others, the Tercier financial group, which thus reappeared in the market. The
Krusnohorsky ivesticni fond investment fund holds 20 percent of Pojistovna Universal,
another 14 percent are held by the Fond Pro prosperitu pruyslu investment fund
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former Tercier [CTK, 1998b]. 
In reaction to the failure of Pojistovna Morava, a recent Czech report on economic
strategy for entering the European Union noted that "state supervision has no teeth ...
and is based on legislation which was drawn up as a quick reaction to the need to create
a competitive environment in this sector. In its current form, the legal arrangement is
general and incomplete. It does not provide adequate support for practical state
intervention even in the case of an insolvent insurance company, which increases the risk
of the necessity of a state bailout" [CTK, 1998c]. The report also took notice of the weak
growth of life insurance, which is apparently the result of insufficiencies in the capital
market and a very limited offer of quality domestic and other stocks. 
Miscellaneous Information on Peculiar Networking
Latvia experienced a major banking crisis during 199495. After independence in
1991 the number of banks grew quickly to 63 in 1993. Many of these banks had large
Russian shareholders and were committed to a large single borrower [FT, 06/06/1995].
In May 1995, four large banks were closed down, among them the largest bank of Latvia,
Banka Balttija [NZZ, 05/23/1995]. At first the government indicated a willingness to
rescue the bank where one-third of the population held their accounts. The Prime
Minister at the time was able to withdraw his personal account before the bank was
closed. As a result  of delayed action, the government failed to prevent asset stripping by
the top management of Banka Baltija [NZZ, 08/03/1995]. In 1998, the overall Russian
exposure of the Latvian banking sector was estimated at 8% of total banking assets, with
3.5% of assets held in GKO´s. The 1998 Russian crisis led to difficulties in some Latvian
banks, with a small bank closing and one large bank facing a run on deposits. 
Latvian privatization suffers from shortcomings similar to Czech Republic. According
to the Commission [1998], there has been some reluctance to use privatization methods,
which would ensure the establishment of competition in the sector concerned.
Substantial stakes of the enterprises already considered to be privatized were allocated
for privatization by voucher. Moreover, there are many minority stakes that remain to be
privatized. So far, the uptake of shares in enterprises by voucher holders has been limited.
Even with a higher rate of uptake of shares by voucher holders, voucher privatization still
carries the risk that enterprises will have a diffused and passive share ownership
structure, which could mean that enterprise restructuring progresses slowly. Secondary
markets enabling the trade of share holdings and allowing a concentration of ownership
are important for mitigating any negative impact of voucher privatization. 
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savings bank, eight of its senior managers took out a $15 million foreign loan, using the
banks equity as collateral, in order to buy for themselves part to the banks new equity
offering. The scheme was derailed by the collapse in the stockmarket, which until that
incident had been soaring due to a boom in bank shares. According to the Commission
(1998), the rapid decline in the Tallin stock market in the second half of 1997 and in the
first half of 1998 revealed corporate malpractice, speculative operations on the stock
market, and faulty control mechanisms in a number of financial enterprises. Excessive
optimism, easy access to funds and sharp competition for market share in the financial
sector, in a context of rapidly expanding economy, were among the key factors that led
to the emergence of these problems. The Russian crisis exacerbated problems already
existing.
The central bank of Estonia has failed to catch on fully to the Hoiupank transaction.
Hoiupank´s former chairman, one of the eight managers involved in the scandal, was
appointed interior minister in January 1998. The current leader of the main free-market
party, who formerly used to be the head of the central bank, has lost his parliamentary
immunity over a missing $10 million loan from the central bank in June 1998. 
In Lithuania, advances in bank restructuring and strategic privatization have often
been driven by ad hoc decisions. At the beginning of 1998, foreign investors owned one
third of the share capital of Lithuanian banks and had controlling stakes in the two largest
private institutions.  A law enacted in April 1997 granted a one-year exemption from
prudential requirements for the two state-owned banks for privatization. A year later, the
authorities decided to liquidate the State Commercial Bank, after repeatedly failing to find
a buyer. In September 1998, the privatization tender for the other, Agricultural Bank,
failed; a new tender is now pending. Dietuvos Draudimas, the largest Lithuanian
insurance company with a market share of 55% and the state-owned Savings Bank still
need to be privatized. At the end of August 1998, public-owned banks still accounted for
some 40% of all outstanding loans from functioning commercial banks. However, this
share has been falling sharply and direct funding of the agricultural sector by public banks
has stopped. A fairly active leasing market has facilitated a measure of agricultural
restructuring. The persistent lack of interest from investors for some enterprises could
change when corporate governance is strengthened and the bankruptcy law is applied
more aggressively. Part of the proceeds of future privatization is being channeled to a
savings institution restitution fund that will be used to compensate households for the
financial losses incurred at the beginning of the reforms. 
In the Czech Republic, it became known in August 1994 that the fifth largest Czech
bank, Agrobanka (founded in 1992) showed negative capital in its 1993 balance sheet.
Foreign banks that were major lenders to Agrobanka claimed that the banking
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Agrobanka and had failed to warn lenders to Agrobanka. Banking supervision first reacted
with a licensing suspension for new banks, which affected a few prominent foreign banks.
The Czech National Bank hoped to induce foreign banks to buy already established small
but undercapitalized private banks. Since this policy showed little success, the bank
license suspension was temporarily lifted in 1995/1996. Agrobanka later was recapitalized
by the state bank [HB, 10/19/1994] and needed to be rescued again in 1996. In 1994, the
three largest banks were quasi-privatized, with the state holding an important share
directly (about 26% in 1994) and indirectly by the National Privatization Fund (NPF ,
3347%). However, managers of some of the former state banks tried to gain control of
their banks by increasing the holdings of own shares and setting up a network of weak
shareholders consisting of major debtors to the banks [HB 05/31/1996]. Jointly with the
top management, major debtors are gaining influence on the business strategies of banks.
It is worth mentioning in that context that one of the largest state-owned banks,
Investicní a Postovní Banka (IPB) reportedly granted a credit to Mr. Klaus to finance his
election campaign in 1992 [WSJ 27/12/1996]. While the Czech National Bank´s
supervisory department was reorganized in 1997, the scope of the banks supervisory
activities still needs to be strengthened to cover all aspects of the EUs body of law, the
acquis communautaire [Commission, 1998]. Similarly, the Securities Commissions
independence and regulatory authority and the Insurance and Pension Scheme
Department of the Ministry of Finance need to be strengthened. 
In Hungary, two major Western banks, Swiss First Boston and ING only withdrew
from their offers to purchase shares in Budapest Bank, when a silent bailout of that bank
was leaked to media [DP , 05/22/1995]. The process of privatization, covering most major
banks besides troubled Postabanka and the largest commercial bank (OTP), so far
resulted in the 60 percent share of foreign ownership in the total registered bank capital.
With regard to OTP , the Hungarian State plans to turn its participation into a single golden
share. This entails a rather large range of power that needs to be exercised properly
[Commission, 1998]. The market is still highly concentrated, with the largest bank OTP
still accounting for roughly 40 percent of aggregate bank assets. This contributes to large
spreads between deposit and lending rates and still weak competition within the sector.
Average market lending and deposit rates have continued to decline gradually in nominal
terms and the spread between the two has fallen. In the past, weaknesses in banks
balance sheets and competition from new non-bank financial operators let too a fall in the
stock of domestic credit extended by banks both in real terms and relative to GDP . While
net credit to the government and to households and small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs) continued to fall sharply, credit to enterprises rose at an accelerating pace for the
second year in a row.
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in Spring 1997, raising concerns about the stability of the banking system [Kurier,
03/01/1997]. The authorities bailed the bank out initially, various re-capitalizations led to
majority re-nationalization, and management was removed. Restructuring of the bank is
still an open issue and no strategic (foreign) investor has yet been found. Since regulations
were not enforced in a prompt and impartial fashion, the Postabanka affair has revealed
worrying failings, suggesting there is still considerable scope for improving both
regulatory laws and implementation. The Hungarian Banking and Capital Market
Supervisory Authority enjoys a certain level of independence, but is still supervised by the
Finance Minister. 
In Slovenia, Nova Ljubljanska Banka still has a dominant market share of about 30
percent. The interest rate agreement between the banks which sets the maximum rates
on deposits is not compatible with a market-oriented financial system [Commission,
1997]. At present foreign owned banks are not allowed to participate in foreign capital
transactions and are not allowed to open branches. The links between bigger enterprises
and their banks are often strong, so that the latter do not exert sufficient financial
discipline on the former [Commission, 1998]. Supervision in the financial sector is not yet
sufficiently strong and a cartel still operates in the banking sector. Because of continued
high state involvement, the financial sector lacks competitive pressure. The main factor
that is preventing rapid consolidation of the banking sector is the pending privatization of
state-owned banks. 
In Poland, the partial privatization of Bank Slaski was a very profitable experience for
its employees only. Immediately after privatization, the shares of this bank soared at the
Warsaw Stock Exchange, basically due to a delay in handing over the shares to the new
owners. Thus, only the employees of Bank Slaski could reap the benefit of a soaring stock
exchange [FT, 01/26/1994]. A major setback to the banking system was the bankruptcy
of the Polish Agrobank, which seemingly was triggered by Polish government action.
After government institutions withdrew about $25 million from Agrobank during 1994,
the bank ran into serious liquidity problems and filed for bankruptcy in April 1995 [DP ,
04/27/1995]. The largest bank in Poland is still the previous State Savings Bank PKO with
assets of  $14.2 billion in 1997. PKO and the insurance giant PZU are included in the
Polish Governments plan for privatization by 2000. PKO´s clients have a 100 percent
deposit protection, while other banks can only guarantee the return up to $5,000 if they
collapse. Due to its cheap deposit base, PKO has fuelled a lending frenzy in 1997 that was
stopped by the National Bank of Poland (NBP) offering deposit accounts at very
preferential rates. Through this unprecedented and highly questionable move, the NBP
attempted to tackle the relatively large spread between deposit and credit interest rates
by effectively competing with the banks it supervised. In 1997 there was a privatization
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revenues from this operation expressed by two international consortia were not
satisfactory from the standpoint of the Polish Treasury [Kornasiewicz, 1998]. In the 1997
sale of Powszechny Bank Kreditowy  (PBK), a Warsaw-based commercial bank, South
Koreas Samsung initially won the open tender to buy the bank. Rather than let PBK fall
into foreign hands, the government, however, cancelled the tender and sold it to a local
Polish consortium for a knock-down price.  Some markets in Poland are still distorted
because particular enterprises are allowed to operate on a loss-making basis
[Commission, 1998], with unsolved issues for banks.
In Romania, the private bank Dacia Felin was put under central bank supervision in
late 1995 due to problems caused by large lending to its major shareholders. Business of
foreign banks was repeatedly restricted, for example in early 1996 when the license for
foreign exchange trading was withdrawn from 18 of 22 banks.  More than half of the
commercials banks assets were non-performing at the end of 1997 and overdue loans
increased from 23% in December 1997 to 31% in mid-1998. The increasing weakness
of banks has been reflected by a sharp decline in foreign assets during the first half of
1998. The amount of credit to the non-bank sector shrank from 24.5% of GDP at the
end of 1996 to 14.4% of GDP at the end of 1997. The share of credits denominated in
foreign currencies has increased, thereby raising the risks linked to a devaluation of the
currency. Banks have increasingly invested in treasury bills, which carry high returns.
Financial supervision of credit institutions is carried out by the Central Bank of
Romania. It has increased powers granted through the 1998 Banking Law, but it has failed
to react appropriately in dealing with several troubled banks according to the EU
Commissions 1998 progress report.
Serious gaps persist in the legislation of securities markets with regard to: insider
regulations, general information to be provided to the public, and as regards
authorization and capital adequacy requirements for investment firms.  Repeated
changes in the legal framework for foreign investment and privatization have made
foreign investors cautious to invest in Romania since the autumn of 1997. The over the
counter exchange RASDAQ represents mainly minority shareholding in state
controlled companies and still performs poorly. Reporting on companies contributes
little to the transparency of markets. Both the official Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE)
and RASDAQ  have not been used sufficiently in the context of privatization nor as
vehicles for raising long term finance. While the National Securities Commission
(CNVM) is formally politically independent, commissioners face political influence and
pressure from the major market actors. Similarly, the Office for Supervision of
Insurance and Reinsurance Activities is not independent and is included in the
structure of the Ministry of Finance. It is a weak institution, with almost no political
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market.
More fundamentally, the absence of a properly functioning market economy, and the
non-respect by a large number of economic agents of their contractual obligations do not
ensure a sound basis for economic activity in Romania. Corporate governance in banks has
not improved. Given the uncertain prospects for privatizing the largest of the public banks,
there is still a strong possibility of moral hazard. This calls for a major strengthening of
supervision activities and for addressing the absence of financial discipline in public
companies and entities which has been the fundamental problem of the Romanian
economy.  A respect of contractual obligations, including timely payments of creditors,
remains elusive in Romania. Data on arrears to banks show a major increase from 1% to
5.6% of GDP between June and December 1997. The government is accumulating large
tax arrears and not viable companies have not been liquidated. The special credits that the
National Bank of Romania (NBR) had been forced to extend to agriculture and enterprises
were terminated and the new statute of the NBR limits the amount of financing that it can
temporarily grant to the government, which are important achievements in the
improvement of the framework for monetary policy [Commission, 1998]. 
In Slovakia, Investicná a Rozvojová Banka (IRB) was in deep trouble in late 1997 and
is now held by the steel mill VSZ which has covertly grabbed control of the bank it is
borrowing from, thus posing systemic risk [Kapoor and Cook, 1997]. VSZ is managed by
people close to HSDC, the former Prime Minister Meciars´ party that allegedly put many
companies in their network during privatization. The continued lack of transparency in
the privatization process and the lack of foreign direct investment have negatively
affected enterprise restructuring. Privatization has continued through direct sales, often
at preferential terms with the possibility of spreading the payments to the National
Property Fund (NPF) over a period of up to ten years. However, an important number
of privatizations have lacked transparency and fairness. Additional examples of
unannounced sales of shares of listed enterprises at sharply reduced prices, often to
unknown buyers, have been recorded. A group of "essential" enterprises, including the
financial sector, has been excluded from privatization. Debts to bondholders or banks can
be rescheduled or cancelled under the Enterprise Revitalization Act through a secretive
and non-transparent procedure with important political involvement. The unequal
treatment of minority shareholders in listed companies in the privatization process
reduced the attractiveness of the stock exchange.  Selling to domestic industrial groups
does not fundamentally improve the financial sectors capacity to restructure. Most new
owners of privatized enterprises typically lack the financial means that are needed for
restructuring, since they already had to invest to acquire the control of the company. As
a resultant, investment for restructuring has to be financed exclusively from retained
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Because of the precarious situation of the government budget, the state will also not be
able to cure the solvency problems of the state-owned banks. Therefore, there is a need
to prepare a rapid sale of the banks to strategic, most probably foreign, investors
[Commission, 1998].
In Bulgaria, bank privatization was started with the sale of one bank in 1997 and the
completion of a second bank privatization in 1998; three more were scheduled for 1998.
Sustained pressure from international institutions has been necessary to keep bank
privatization moving forward, however [Commission, 1998]. The government has
sometimes appeared uncertain about the necessity of far-reaching reforms and the
national authorities have intermittently made statements that sent mixed signals about
the governments commitment to rapid bank privatization. The State Savings Bank, which
still holds most household savings, is being transformed into a commercial bank. In the
Bulgarian insurance sector, there is a danger of monopolization of the market by the
former state insurance companies since the requirements for licensing are very high.
Progress has been made in bringing insurance legislation into line with the acquis,
although the insurance market is still underdeveloped. 
The Bulgarian Government also attempted to accelerate enterprise privatization and
to increase transparency of the process by contracting out the privatization of several
large companies. The cumulative share of divested long-term assets of enterprises
amounted to 20% at the end of 1997. However, many firms have been bought by their
managers and employees. Although this is helping to consolidate support for market
reforms, it may slow down the rate of improvements in competitiveness since it may not
be conducive to rapid restructuring.  Moreover, questions may be raised about the ability
of worker-owned firms to undertake restructuring when it requires workers layoffs. The
new owners are unlikely to have substantial funds of their own with which to undertake
investment in modern plant and equipment. They may face special problems in raising
finance because the banks have little experience of lending to such enterprises, and also
because banks are currently adopting a very cautious approach to lending. 
The authorities have announced their intention to privatize companies by offering
shares through the stock market. So far, little has happened in this area. The Bulgarian
Stock Exchange became operational in late 1997, but trade is still limited. To date, shares
are listed in just one company on the official market, but an active over-the-counter
market has appeared. The authorities are also keen to sell some companies by
distributing privatization vouchers to the population. The number of investment
intermediaries increased as a result to the transformation of the former Privatization
Funds into investment funds. The Securities and Stock Exchange Commission also
licensed a number of banks and investment funds to serve as investment intermediaries.
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diffused ownership structure that is unable to exercise effective control over the
enterprises.
As the recovery strengthens and economic activity picks up, the ability of banks to act
as responsible providers of investment finance will come under increasing attention. The
current ability of the Bulgarian financial sector to fulfill the role of financial intermediation
between savers and investors in the changed circumstances of the currency board
arrangement remains largely untested. Banks have to date undertaken very little new
lending, so it is impossible to assess whether they are able to act as responsible financial
intermediaries. The governments ability to borrow money at low rates suggests that
banks are either reluctant or unable to lend for productive investment because of the
need to strengthen balance sheets. This is likely to constrain economic growth. 
3. Prevailing Inefficiencies in the Banking Sector
3.1. Bank Governance and Financial Crises
Banking reform has been an ongoing issue in all CEEC-10 countries. Perhaps with the
exception of deposit insurance [Groszek, 1995], the formal Central European candidates
for the European Union accession have established almost all the institutions needed to
perform the financial market functions. However, there remains a lot to be done in the
implementation in order to make the financial system a contributor to the economic
growth which, so far, has been generated by factors remaining outside the banking
system.  Furthermore, the implementation needs to "create an effective and stable
framework for monetary policy" [Kozinski, 1995; Groszek, 1995]. The institutional
development of the emerging financial systems is only possible when governments
maintain fiscal discipline. A failure to keep the state budget deficit low contributed, until
1994, to the crowding-out of private investors from the financial markets in Poland
[Groszek, 1995; Kozinski, 1995] and in Hungary [Buch, 1995; Bonin and Shaffer, 1995].
A successful disinflation is a favorable contributing factor to the financial system
development since it helps to avoid taxation of "paper profits" [Solarz, 1995]. The financial
sector cannot facilitate the growth of financial intermediation if governments and
parliamentarians remain reluctant to establish rules of prudent banking. Prudent financial
institutions reduce market imperfections and improve allocation of resources by
performing the following functions:
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securing a transfer of wealth.
(b) Managing investment portfolios.
(c) Transforming illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, providing liquidity insurance and
risk sharing opportunities to agents.
(d) Minimizing transaction costs, monitoring of loans and signaling their efficient
allocation [Vives, 1991].
One of the major sources of bank failure comes from (c), which is strongly influenced
by international capital flows. The overvaluation and real appreciation of most CEEC-10
currencies has contributed to serious distortions of financial markets [Orlowski and
Corrigan, 1997]. Banks and firms have been able to generate profits by engaging in
speculative transactions and making use of deliberate fixidity of exchange rates and delays
in exchange rate and interest rate adjustments by governments and central banks.
There is a considerable degree of financial distress in most of the 10 CEECs. Many of
the state-owned and newly founded private banks have been undercapitalized [Baer and
Gray, 1996; Commission, 1997; Jones, 1997; Krzak, 1997; Tsantis, 1997]. Out of the total
of about 500 banks in the region, at least 200 were either recapitalized (mostly the large
banks with a market share of 6080%) and/or merged with other banks or closed after
outright bankruptcy. Bank crises took place in Estonia (1992), Latvia (1995) and Bulgaria
(1996/97), causing losses of savings deposits of 25% to 40%, respectively [Dobrynski,
1995; Krzak, 1997]. In the Czech Republic the Czech National Bank (CNB) took control of
five large banks in 1996, accounting for less than four percent of banking system assets,
under special "conservatorship". It further liquidated six other failed banks in the period
19941996 [Folkerts-Landau et. al., 1997]. Most serious asset-quality problems were
experienced by the new, private Czech banks that were established in the period
19911993 when the countrys licensing rules were lax. In 1994 alone, the CNB closed
three banks for asset-quality and alleged fraud reasons. It later placed several worst
performing banks under special monitoring regime and closed seven more banks since the
beginning of 1995. The CNB was forced to take $5 billion of non-performing assets of banks
off their balance sheets in the period 19951996. At the end of 1996, classified loans
constituted 30.1 percent of total bank assets (down from 33.4 percent in 1995) and in the
fall of 1998 another banking crisis emerged in the Czech Republic. Poland and Hungary are
experiencing similar poor asset quality problems although the situation has considerably
improved over the last three years. Classified loans in Hungary were 8 percent at the end
of 1998, down considerably from the peak level of 28.5 percent in 1993. In the same year,
they reached in Poland 10.5 percent, compared with the top level of 31 percent in 1993.
Bank privatization in the CEEC-10 is hardly progressing with the exception of Poland
and Hungary. In Czech Republic, where privatization was pushed forward, a lack of
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widespread moral hazard. Only in Hungary and Estonia there are certain signs that the
banking sector could be opened to EU competition after 1999 as envisaged in the
association agreements with the EU. The weak financial sector may become a stumbling
block for EU-membership for most of the 10 CEECs. 
In well-developed financial systems, banks overcome information and incentive
problems by monitoring the firms they finance [Hellwig, 1991]. On the contrary, banks in
Central Europes transforming economies having difficulties in managing themselves are
not fully prepared to exert a positive influence on the management of corporations and
to increase the efficiency of firms. One can rather expect tinkering around with debt. The
banks attempt to circumvent apparent management problems by applying slow
withdrawals from troubled enterprises and balance sheet cosmetics. Supported by policy
makers, banks take advantage of market imperfections and contribute to high spreads of
interest rates and to foreign refinancing, while governments keep the domestic currency
overvalued. 
3.2. The Size of Financial Markets
The smallness of financial markets in the transforming economies can be attributed
to four general reasons: 
 the neglect of financial intermediation under communism (and to varying degrees
also during the first years of transition), 
 the low level of GDP per capita, 
 the small size of population of most countries concerned, 
 the repeated cases of fraud and imprudent banking which lead to significant financial
losses by households and businesses.
Further problems of financial markets in these countries are triggered by their
classification in the group of emerging market economies. Turbulent speculative attacks
on financial markets of Asian and Latin American countries in 1997 and the spillover from
the Russian crises in 1998 have slowed down the growth of capitalization of financial
markets in CEEC-10s [Orlowski, 1999]. Investors that have held securities of CEEC-10
in their emerging market portfolios express worries about possible contagion risks
[Linne, 1999]. They have partly reconsidered allocation levels to emerging and
established markets. These effects are posing major problems. Underdeveloped markets
are prone to speculative attacks. Foreign investors can easily influence asset prices on the
financial markets of the economies in transition and exercise a disturbing influence on the
real economy [HB 28/07/1995].
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conclude that banks cannot have an overall strong impact on economic efficiency in
CEEC-10. Continuous deficiencies in the banking sector imply that banks need to
undergo far-reaching institutional improvements. Banks need to improve trustworthiness
to their customers thus attract a higher degree of financial intermediation. Even if banks
are institutionally prepared for prudent banking and they become more trustworthy, it
will take a while until they grow strong enough to have an overall positive impact on the
efficiency of the transition economies.
The volume of financial assets in relation to the GDP in CEEC-10 is roughly 85
percent lower than in the USA, EU or Japan where it is higher than 300 percent. The high
ratio of Japan 452 percent in 1998 reflects significant inefficiencies that became
transparent during the 1997/1998 financial market crisis in Japan.
There are, however significant differences among individual Central European
countries in terms of the degree of financial intermediation.  The two countries where
the financial market reform has significantly evolved show average (Hungary 86%) and
below average (Estonia 49%) ratios. There might be a threat of bursting financial bubbles
in several countries where financial reforms have been lagging behind but where there is
a relatively large size of banking intermediation and stock market capitalization (Czech
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia), as shown in Table 5.
4. Synthesis
The financial sector reform in the CEEC-10 is lagging in the process of the economic
transformation. Privatisation, legal infrastructure and the establishment of a sound and
independent supervision of financial market institutions are advancing slowly.
There have been excessive pressures from political circles, governments, central
banks, managers and new owners of state-owned and newly privatised large corporations
emerged on operations of financial institutions. Members of these politically powerful
networks share interest and gain from imprudent banking. They tend to delay institutional
reforms and implementation of efficient banking, stock exchanges, and insurance
supervision. They further attempt to prevent effective legal actions against fleecing of
private investors and the reestablishment of financial market institutions that have a
history of involvement in bankruptcies and firm dissolution where considerable amounts
of money have disappeared or have been transferred abroad.
Without an effective supervision and strict legal rules aimed at protecting depositors
and small private investors, the prevailing privileged bank/interfirm relationships
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applicant countries for the EU-membership. The privileged interfirm/bank relationships
have become a trap for corporate governance.  A requirement of the reduction in the
scope of this problem would be a useful clause in the programs of the accession of the
examined countries to the European Union. 
27
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 170  Privileged Interfirm/Bank ...References
Newspapers and Journals: 
DP Die Presse, Vienna
FT Financial Times, London
HB Handelsblatt, Frankfurt
IFS International Financial Statistics, IMF , Washington D.C.
Kurier
NZZ Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Zurich
WSJ The Wall Street Journal Europe
The Banker, London
Akerloff, George A., and David M. Romer (1994). "Looting: the Economic
Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit". Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. The
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. (quoted by Baer and Gray 1996).
Allen, Franklin (1993). "Strategic Management and Financial Markets". Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 14, 1122.
Baer, Herbert L. and Cheryl W. Gray (1996). "Debt as a Control Device in
Transitional Economies: The Experiences of Hungary and Poland". in: Roman Frydman,
Cheryl W. Gray and Andrzej Rapaczynski (eds.). "Corporate Governance in Central
Europe and Russia". Volume 1, Central European University Press Budapest, London,
New York 1996, 68110.
Baldwin, Richard, Joseph Francois and Richard Portes (1997). "The Costs and
Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: the Impact on the EU and Central Europe".
Economic Policy 24, 125176.
Balling, Morten (1998). "Corporate Governance: A Keynote Speech". [in:] Balling,
Morton/Hennessy, Elizabeth/OBrien, Richard (eds.). "Corporate Governance,
Financial Markets and Global Convergence". Kluwer/Société Unversitaire Européenne
de Recherches Financieres (SUERF), xixxvi.
Berglöf, Erik (1997). "Reforming Corporate Governance: Redirecting the
European Agenda". Economic Policy 24, 93123.
Boeri, Tito/Perasso, Giancarlo (1998). "Privatization and Corporate Governance:
Some Lessons from Experience of Transitional Economies". [in:] Balling, Morton/
Hennessy, Elizabeth/OBrien, Richard (eds.). "Corporate Governance, Financial
Markets and Global Convergence". Kluwer/Société Unversitaire Européenne de
Recherches Financieres (SUERF).
28
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 170  G. Fink, P . R. Haiss, L. T. Orlowski, D. Salvatore29
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 170  Privileged Interfirm/Bank ...
Bonin, J. P . and Mark Shaffer (1995). "Banks, Firms, Bad Debts and Bankruptcy in
Hungary 199194". London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance,
Discussion Paper No. 234, April 1995.
Buch, Claudia (1995). "Bad Debt and Foreign Support  the Experience of Central
Europe". PHARE ACE Conference on The Role of the Banking System in the Economic
Transformation of Central European Countries, Organizer Urszula Plowiec, Warsaw
May 1820, 1995.
Cejková, V. (1998). "The Development of the Insurance Industry in Europe and the
World". Odborny Bankovy Casopis/National Bank of Slovakia Banking Journal 5:
3035.
Commission (1998). Agenda 2000, Commission Opinions concerning the
Applications for Membership to the European Union. Brussels.
CTK (1998a): KC 0.5 bn loss brings Pojistóvná Morava to its knees. CTK Czech
News Agency, June 23, 1998.
CTK (1998b): Pojistóvná Universal was member of ill-famed TercierMFD. CTK
Czech News Agency, June 8, 1998.
CTK (1998c): Czech Republic: Insurance System is Incompatible with European
Union. STK Czech News Agency, June 11, 1998.
Dobrinsky, Rumen (1995). "Bad Enterprise Debt in Bulgaria". WIIW-Research
Reports No. 211, Vienna, January 1995. 
Drucker, Peter (1991). "Reckoning with the Pension Fund Revolution". Harvard
Business Review, March-April 1991, 106114.
Fink, Gerhard and Peter Haiss (1997a). "Financial Market Reform in Eastern
Europe". [in:] Lucjan Orlowski and Dominick Salvatore (eds.). "Trade and Payments in
Central and Eastern Europes Transforming Economies". Greenwood Press 1997,
170204.
Fink, Gerhard and Peter Haiss (1997b). "Seven Years of Financial Market Reform
in Central Europe". SUERF (Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches
Financieres, eds.) SUERF Studies No. 3, Amsterdam, 1998, s. 5795.
Fink, Gerhard and Robert Schediwy (1992). "Weak Ownership: Lessons for
Eastern Europe". [in:] H. Siebert (ed.) "The Transformation of Socialist Economies".
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen 1992, 8193.
Folkerts-Landau, David, Donald Mathieson and Garry Schinasi (1997).
"International Capital Markets". IMF, Washington, DC, 1997.
Frydman, Roman, Cheryl W. Gray and Andrzej Rapaczynski (eds) (1996).
"Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia". Volumes 1 and 2, Central
European University Press Budapest, London, New York.30
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 170  G. Fink, P . R. Haiss, L. T. Orlowski, D. Salvatore
Groszek, Mieczyslaw (1995). "Role of Banks in Financing of Economic
Development". PHARE ACE Conference on The Role of the Banking System in the
Economic Transformation of Central European Countries, Organizer Urszula Plowiec,
Warsaw May 1820, 1995.
Harris, F. (1998). "Heart of Darkness". Business Central Europe 5: 5758.
Hayri, Aydin / McDermott, Gerald (1998). "The Network Properties of Corporate
Governance and Industrial Restructuring: A Post-Socialist Lesson". [in:] "Industrial and
Corporate Change". Vol. 7, No. 1, Oxford University Press, pp. 153193
Hellwig, Martin (1991). "Banking, Financial Intermediation, and Corporate
Finance". [in:] "European Financial Integration". Cambridge University Press, 5563.
Jones, Colin (1997). "Prickly in Prague". The Banker 2, 4148.
Kapoor, Michael and Joe Cook (1997). "Banking Survey  Heading for the Sun".
Business Central Europe, Oct. 1997, 4358.
Koguchi, Kazuhiko (1993). "Financial Conglomeration". [in:] OECD (ed.) "Financial
Conglomerates" OECD 1993, Paris, 713.
Kozinski, Witold (1995). "The Role of the Banking System in the Transformation Process
of the Polish Economy". PHARE ACE Conference on The Role of the Banking System in the
Economic Transformation of Central European Countries, Organizer Urszula Plowiec,
Warsaw May 1820, 1995.
Linne, Thomas (1999). "Contagion Effects of Central and East European Currency
Crises". The Halle Institute for Economic Research: Discussion Paper No. 96, April.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1995).
Austria, OECD Economic Surveys, OECD, Paris 1995.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1996). The
Czech Republic. OECD Economic Surveys, OECD, Paris 1995.
Orlowski, Lucjan T. (1999). "The Asian and the Russian Financial Crises:
Propagation Effects and Policy Responses in Central Europes Transition Economies".
The Halle Institute for Economic Research: Discussion Paper, forthcoming.
Orlowski, Lucjan T. and Thomas Corrigan (1997). "The Link Between Real
Exchange Rates and Capital Accounts in Central European Transforming Economies".
Journal of Emerging Markets, Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall/Winter 1997; 519.
Porter, Michael (1992). "Capital Disadvantages: Americas Failing Capital
Investment System". Harvard Business Review 5; 6582.
Solarz, Jan (1995). "What Model of Banking System Should Be Functioning in the
Period of Integration with the European Union". PHARE ACE Conference on The Role
of the Banking System in the Economic Transformation of Central European
Countries. Organizer Urszula Plowiec, Warsaw May 1820, 1995.Thurow, Lester (1992). "Head to Head". Kluwer, New York.
Triska Dusan (1995). "Post-Privatisation Securities Markets in the Czech Republic".
[in:] Stilipon Nestor (ed), "Mass Privatisation  An Initial Assessment" Paris: CCET-OECD
1995, 87105.
Vives, Xavier (1991). "Regulatory Reform in European Banking". European
Economic Review, Vol. 35, North Holland, 505515.
Walter, Ingo (1994). "Global Financial Markets". [in:] Michael Johnson (ed.) "Global
Management" Sterling Publications, London, 282290.
31
Studies & Analyses CASE No. 170  Privileged Interfirm/Bank ...32
148 Urban Górski, The Interbank Money Market in Ukraine
149 Jaros³aw Neneman, The Reform of Indirect Taxation in Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Poland and Romania
150 Rafa³ Antczak, Ma³gorzata Antczak, The Case of Gradual Approach to Foreign
Trade Liberalisation in Transition Economies
151 Wojciech Maliszewski, Medium-Term Fiscal Projection for Selected Countries
in Transition 
152 Rafa³ Antczak, Monetary Expansion in Transition Economies and Their Influence
on Inflation Performance
154 Krzysztof Rybiñski, Thomas Linne, The Emerging Financial System of Poland:
Institutional Constraints and External Links
155 Jacek Cukrowski, Jaros³aw Janecki, Financing Budget Deficits by Seigniorage
Revenues: the Case of Poland 1990-1997
158 M. D¹browski (ed.), M. Dekhtiarchuk, U. Górski, P. Kovalev, Y. Kuzmin 
and K. Sultan, Ukraine: From Fragile Stabilization to Financial Crisis
159 M. D¹browski, U. Górski, M. Jarociñski, Inflationary Consequences of Devaluation
Crises in Russia and Ukraine: The First Observations
161 Magdalena Tomczyñska, Comparative Analyses of Direct Tax Systems in Selected
Central European Countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania
162 Joanna Siwiñska, Public Debt Structure and Dynamics in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Romania
167 Ondrej Schneider, Implicit Public Debt of the Czech Social Security System
168 Marek Styczeñ, Socio-demographic Forecast of Poland, 19972050, for Modelling
Incomes and Social Security Retirement Pensions
169 Joanna Siwiñska, The External Public Debt of Baltic and Selected CIS Coutries in
Year 19921997, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Moldova, Russian Federation and Ukraine
170 Gerhard Fink, Peter R. Haiss, Lucjan T. Orlowski, Dominick Salvatore Privileged,
Interfirm/Bank Relationships in Central Europe: Trigger or Trap for Corporate
Governance? 